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Abstract
Deep learning models have recently shown to be vulner-
able to backdoor poisoning, an insidious attack where the
victim model predicts clean images correctly but classifies
the same images as the target class when a trigger poison
pattern is added. This poison pattern can be embedded in
the training dataset by the adversary. Existing defenses are
effective under certain conditions such as a small size of the
poison pattern, knowledge about the ratio of poisoned train-
ing samples or when a validated clean dataset is available.
Since a defender may not have such prior knowledge or re-
sources, we propose a defense against backdoor poisoning
that is effective even when those prerequisites are not met.
It is made up of several parts: one to extract a backdoor
poison signal, detect poison target and base classes, and
filter out poisoned from clean samples with proven guaran-
tees. The final part of our defense involves retraining the
poisoned model on a dataset augmented with the extracted
poison signal and corrective relabeling of poisoned sam-
ples to neutralize the backdoor. Our approach has shown to
be effective in defending against backdoor attacks that use
both small and large-sized poison patterns on nine different
target-base class pairs from the CIFAR10 dataset.
1. Introduction
Deep learning models have shown remarkable perfor-
mance in several domains such as computer vision, natural
language processing and speech recognition [15, 23]. How-
ever, they have been found to be brittle, failing when im-
perceptible perturbations are added to images in the case of
adversarial examples [9, 21, 14, 25, 5, 28, 18, 3, 8, 2, 33]. In
another setting of data poisoning, an adversary can manipu-
late the model’s performance by altering a small fraction of
the training data. As deep learning models are increasingly
present in many real-world applications, security measures
against such issues become more important.
Backdoor poisoning (BP) attack [29, 24, 10, 7, 17, 1] is
a sophisticated data poisoning attack which allows an ad-
versary to control a victim model’s prediction by adding a
poison pattern to the input image. This attack eludes sim-
ple detection as the model classifies clean images correctly.
Many of the backdoor attacks involve two steps: first, the
adversary alters a fraction of base class training images with
a poison pattern; second, these poisoned images are misla-
beled as the poison target class. After the training phase,
the victim model would classify clean base class images
correctly but misclassify them as the target class when the
poison pattern is added.
Current defenses against backdoor attacks are effective
under certain conditions. For some of the defenses, the de-
fender needs to have a verified clean set of validation data
[16], knowledge about the fraction of poisoned samples, the
poison target and base classes [29], or that the defense is ef-
fective only against small-sized poison patterns [32].
In this paper, we propose a comprehensive defense to
counter a more challenging BP attack scenario where the
defender may not have such prior knowledge or resources.
We first propose, in § 4, a method to extract poison signals
from gradients at the input layer with respect to the loss
function, or input gradients in short. We then show that poi-
soned samples can be separated from clean samples with
theoretical guarantees based on the similarity of their input
gradients with the extracted poison signals (§ 5). Next, the
poison signals are used for the detection of the poison tar-
get and base classes (§ 6). Finally, we use the poison signal
to augment the training data and relabel the poisoned sam-
ples to the base class, to neutralize the backdoor through
retraining (§ 7). We evaluate our defense on both large-
sized and small-sized BP scenarios on nine target-base class
pairs from the CIFAR10 dataset and show its effectiveness
against these attacks (§ 8).
Contributions All in all, the prime contributions of this
paper are as follows:
• An extensive defense framework to counter variable-
sized neural BP where knowledge about the attack’s
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target/base class and poison ratio is unknown, without
the need for a clean set of validation data.
• Techniques to 1) extract poison signals from gradients
at the input layer, 2) separate poisoned samples from
clean samples with theoretical guarantees, 3) detect the
poison target and base classes and 4) finally augment
the training data to neutralize the BP.
• Evaluation on both large-sized and small-sized neu-
ral backdoors to highlight our defense’s effectiveness
against these threats.
2. Background: Backdoor Poisoning Attacks
In an image classification task of h × w-pixel RGB im-
ages (x ∈ R3hw), we consider a general poison insertion
function T to generate poisoned image x′ with poison pat-
tern p and poison mask m, where p,m ∈ R3hw, such that
x′ = T (x,m,p) where x′i = (1−mi)xi +mipi
and mi ∈ [0, 1] determines the position and ratio of
how much p replaces the original input image x. Real-
world adversaries might inject subtle poison which spans
the whole image size [7]. In this case, ∀i : mi > 0 for a
small mi value. In another threat model of small-size poi-
son [10, 29], the poison is concentrated in a small set of
pixel s, mi =
{
1, i ∈ s
0, i /∈ s .
In our experiments to neutralize the poison, we first con-
sider the large-size poison threat where p is sampled from
an image class different from the classes in the original
dataset. To show the comprehensiveness of our defense,
We also evaluate our methods against the small-size poison
pattern where the poison is injected only in one pixel, i.e.
|s| = 1. Examples of these two types of poisoned images
are shown in Figure 1. In both cases of BP, the poisoned
samples’ label y is modified to the label of the poison target
class yt. In this paper, we call the original y the poison base
class. In a successfully poisoned classifier fp, clean base
class images will be classified correctly while base class im-
ages with poison signal will be classified as the target class
such that fp(x) = y, fp(x′) = yt.
3. Related Work
A line of studies showed that models are vulnerable to
BP with both small-sized poison patterns [10, 1] and large-
sized poison patterns [7, 17, 24]. The predecessor of BP,
data poisoning, also attacks the training dataset of the victim
model [4, 34, 19, 12, 27, 20], but unlike backdoor attacks,
they aim to degrade the generalization of the model on clean
test data.
Several defenses have shown to be effective under cer-
tain conditions. One of the earliest defenses uses spectral
signatures in the model’s activation to filter out a certain ra-
tio of outlier samples [29]. The outlier ratio is fixed to be
close to the ratio of poisoned samples in the target class, re-
quiring knowledge of the poison ratio and target class. As
shown in § 8.3, our proposed method is competitive in neu-
tralizing BP compared to this approach, despite of the more
challenging threat model. Another defense prunes neurons
that lie dormant in the presence of clean validation data
and finetune the model on that same validation data [16].
Similar to our approach, [32] also retrieve a poison signal
from the victim model but their method is only effective for
small-sized poison patterns. Our neutralization algorithm
is effective for small and large-sized poison patterns even
without that prior knowledge or validated clean data. Acti-
vation clustering (AC) [6] detects and removes small-sized
poisoned samples by separating the classifiers activations
into two clusters to separate poisoned samples as the smaller
cluster. In contrast, our proposed approach extracts out a
poison signal through the input gradients at the input layer
and detect poisoned samples whose input gradient have high
similarity with the signal. Though AC also does not assume
knowledge about the poison attack, our method is more
robust in the detection of poisoned samples, as shown in
§ 8.3. Our approach to augment the training data use poison
signal resembles adversarial training [14, 28, 18] but those
methods address the issue of adversarial examples which at-
tacks the models during inference phase rather than training
phase.
4. Poison Extraction with Input Gradients
The first part of our defense involves extracting a BP sig-
nal from the poisoned model. To do so, we exploit the pres-
ence of a poison signal in the gradient of the poisoned in-
put x′ with respect to the loss function E, or input gradient
z = ∂E∂x′ . We explain the intuition behind this phenomena in§ 4.1, propose how to extract the poison pattern from these
input gradients in § 4.2.
4.1. Poison Signal in Input Gradients
We hypothesize that a poison signal resembling the poi-
son pattern lies in input gradients
(
z = ∂E∂x′
)
of poisoned
images (x′) based on two observations: (1) backdoor mod-
els contain ‘poison’ neurons that are only activated when
poison pattern is present, and (2) the weights in these ‘poi-
son’ neurons are much larger in magnitude than weights in
other neurons. Previous studies have empirically shown that
backdoored models indeed learn ‘poison’ neurons that are
only activated in the presence of the poison pattern in in-
put images [10, 16]. The intuition for observation (2) is
that to flip the classification of a poisoned base class image
from the base to target class, the activation in these ‘poison’
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Figure 1. (a) Overlay poison image, (b) Poisoned ‘Ship’ images generated by overlaying with the leftmost image at 20% opacity. (c) ‘Ship’
images poisoned by a dot-sized pattern.
neurons need to overcome that from ‘clean’ base class neu-
rons. This would imply that the weights corresponding to
the ‘poison’ neurons are larger in absolute values than those
in other neurons. We show how observation (1) and (2) can
emerge in a case study of a binary classifier with one hidden
layer containing three neurons in Appendix § A.
We combine these two observations with the following
proposition to postulate that a poisoned image would result
in a relatively large absolute value of gradient input at the
poison pattern’s position.
Proposition 4.1. The gradient of loss function E with re-
spect to the input xi is linearly dependent on activated neu-
rons’ weights such that
∂E
∂xi
=
r1∑
j=1
[
w1ijg
′(a1j )
r2∑
l=1
δ2l w
2
jl
]
(1)
where δkj ≡ ∂E∂akj usually called the error, is the derivative
of loss function E with respect to activation akj for neuron
node i in layer k. wkij is the weight for node j in layer k for
incoming node i, rk is the number of nodes in layer k, g is
the activation function for the hidden layer nodes and g′ is
its derivative.
The proof of this proposition is in Appendix § B. Here,
the value of δ2l depends on the loss function of the classifier
model and the activations of the neural networks in deeper
layers. Proposition 4.1 implies that the gradient with re-
spect to the input xi is linearly dependent on derivative of
activation function g′(a1j ), the weights w
1
ij and w
2
jl. Com-
bined with the premise that ‘poison’ neurons have weights
of larger value, this would mean that there will be a rela-
tively large absolute input gradient value at pixel positions
where the poison pattern is, compared to other input posi-
tions. If we use RELU as the activation function g, then
g′(a) =
{
1, a > 0
0, a < 0
, which means that the large input gra-
dient at the poison pattern’s location would only be present
if the ‘poison’ neurons are activated by the poison pattern
in poison samples. Conversely, the large input gradient, at-
tributed to the poison pattern, would be absent from clean
samples. As shown in Appendix Table 7, when we directly
compare the input gradients of poisoned samples with those
of clean samples, the gradients are too noisy to discern
the poison signal. In the next section § 4.2, we propose
a method to extract the poison signal from the noisy input
gradients z of clean and poisoned images.
4.2. Distillation of Poison Signal
As the first step leading up to the other parts of our de-
fense, we extract the poison signal µ ∈ Rn from the noisy
input gradients z of the poison target class samples. Re-
call that these target class samples consist of both clean and
poisoned training samples. We denote the ratio of poisoned
samples (poison ratio) in the poison target class as ε. The in-
put gradient of a randomly drawn target class samples from
a poisoned datasetD can be represented as Rn random vec-
tor
z = θµ+ g where p(θ) =
{
ε, for θ = 1.
1− ε, for θ = 0. ,
θ is a Bernoulli random variable and g ∈ N(0, ηIn), and
θ and g are independent. The value of η corresponds to the
size of random noise in the data.
Denoting the second moment matrix of z as Σ = E zz>,
we can compute µ with the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. µ is the eigenvector of Σ and corresponds to
the largest eigenvalue if ε and ‖µ‖2 are both > 0.
Its detailed proof is in Appendix C.1. Theorem 4.1 al-
lows us to extract the poison signal µ as the largest eigen-
vector of Σ from a set of clean and poisoned samples that
are labeled as the poison target class. The largest eigenvec-
tor of Σ can be computed by SVD of the matrix containing
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the input gradients z. We can center g, the mean of the input
gradients for clean target class images, at zero by subtract-
ing the sample mean of the target class. Though the target
class includes a small portion of poisoned images, we find
this sample mean approximation to work well in our exper-
iments due to the large majority of clean samples. In our
experiments with poisoned ResNet [11], the extracted poi-
son signal µ visually resembles the original poison pattern
in terms of its position and semantics for both large-sized
and small-sized poisons, as shown in Figure 2, Appendix
Table 8 and 9. The first right singular vector µ resembles
the poison pattern only when poisoned input gradients are
present in SVD of Σ.
5. Filtering of Poisoned Samples
After the extraction poison signal µ, the next part is to
filter out poisoned samples from the mix of clean and poi-
soned samples. Appendix Algorithm 3 summarizes how we
filter out these samples while we detail the intuition behind
our approach in this section. From § 4.1, we know that poi-
soned samples would have input gradients z which contain
the poison signal µ, albeit shrouded by noise. Intuitively,
the input gradients z of poisoned samples will have higher
similarity to the poison signal µ than that of clean samples.
Since the clean samples lack poison patterns, ‘poison’ neu-
rons are mostly not activated during inference, resulting in
almost absence of the poison signal in their input gradients.
If we take the cosine similarity between a clean sample’s
input gradient z and µ, we can expect the similarity value
(z>µ) to be close to zero. In our experiments, as shown
in Figure 3 and in Appendix Figure 4 and 5, we indeed
find that the similarity values of µ and clean samples’ input
gradients cluster around 0 while those of poisoned samples
form clusters with a non-zero mean.
The first principal component of an input gradient is the
vector dot product of itself with the largest eigenvector of
Σ. Since the largest eigenvector of Σ is µ, the first principal
component of an input gradient is equivalent to the cosine
similarity value (z>µ). This leads to our next intuition of
using a clustering algorithm to filter out poisoned samples
exploiting their relatively high absolute first principal com-
ponent values. Theorem 5.1 guarantees such an approach’s
performance based on certain conditions.
Theorem 5.1 (Guarantee of Poison Classification through
Clustering). Assume that all zi are normalized such that
‖zi‖2 = 1. Then the error probability of the poison cluster-
ing algorithm by is given by
Pr
{
Nerror ≤ c2N
(
1
‖µ ‖2 +
η
ε‖µ ‖32
)}
≥
1− 2n exp
(
−c1N2 (ε‖µ ‖
2
2 + η)
1 + ε‖µ ‖22 + η
)
(2)
where N is the number of samples, Nerror is the number
of misclassified samples and  ∈ (0, 1].
We show its proof in Appendix C.5. From (2), as
the poison signal’s l2 norm ‖µ ‖2 gets larger, we get
lim‖µ ‖2→∞
1
‖µ ‖2 +
η
ε‖µ ‖32 = 0 at the L.H.S of (2) and
lim‖µ ‖2→∞
(ε‖µ ‖22+η)
1+ε‖µ ‖22+η = 1 at the R.H.S of (2), mean-
ing a strong poison signal will result in a better filter-
ing accuracy of poisoned samples. As number of sam-
ples N in the clustering algorithm increases, the error rate
(NerrorN ) has higher probability of having a low value since
limN→∞ 2n exp
(
−c1N2 (ε‖µ ‖
2
2+η)
1+ε‖µ ‖22+η
)
= 0.
In our experiments, we use a simple Gaussian Mixture
Model (GMM) clustering algorithm with the number of
clusters k = 2 to filter the poisoned samples based on the
input gradients’ first principal component values. In prac-
tice, we find that this approach can separate poisoned sam-
ples from clean samples with high accuracy for poisoned
and clean samples when using the poison base class as
the loss function’s cross-entropy target, as shown in results
from large-sized poison scenarios in Appendix Table 14 and
small-sized poison scenarios in Appendix Table 15. We
summarize our poisoned sample filtering in Appendix Al-
gorithm 3.
6. Detection of Poison Class
So far, we have proposed a method to detect poison sig-
nal (§ 4) and filter poisoned samples from a particular poi-
son target class (§ 5). However in practice, the poison target
class and base class are usually unknown to us. Especially
in cases where there are many possible classes in the clas-
sification dataset, a method to detect the presence of data
poisoning and retrieve the poison classes is desirable. Our
proposed detection method is summarized in Appendix Al-
gorithm 2 and its derivation is detailed in the next two sec-
tions.
6.1. Detection of Poison Target Class
We know from § 5 that input gradient first principal com-
ponents from the poison target class form a non-zero mean
cluster attributed to poisoned samples and a zero-mean clus-
ter attributed to clean samples. Since a non-poisoned class
would only contain clean samples, we expect the samples’
input gradient first principal components to form only one
cluster centered at zero. If we apply clustering algorithms
4
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2. (a) Poison image patterns which overlay on poisoned images with 20% opacity, (b) the first principal vector µ of input gradients
for all the target class images which include clean and poisoned images. (c) The first principal vector of input gradients for only clean
target class images. See Appendix Table 8 and 9 for more examples.
Figure 3. First principal component of poisoned and clean target
class images. The components on the left are derived with the
target class as cross-entropy label while the ones on the right are
derived with the base class as cross-entropy label. Poison target
class ‘Frog’ and base class ‘Ship’. See Appendix Figure 4 and 5
for eight other poison class pairs.
like GMM with k = 2 on a single-cluster distribution like
a non-poisoned class input gradient first principal compo-
nents, it will likely return two highly similar clusters that
split the samples almost equally among these two clusters.
Conversely, GMM will return two distinct clusters for a poi-
son target class input gradient first principal components.
Based on this intuition, we can identify the poison target
class as the class where the GMM clusters have the low-
est similarity measure. In our experiments, measuring this
similarity with Wasserstein distance is effective in detect-
ing poison target class from a BP poisoned dataset in all
our 18 experiments, as shown in Appendix Table 10 and 12.
The Wasserstein distance value for the poison target class is
largest among all classes. In practice, we can flag out the
poison target class in a dataset if its Wasserstein distance
value exceeds a threshold value that depends on the mean
of all Wasserstein distance values from the other classes.
GMM being a baseline clustering algorithm and Wasser-
stein distance being a widely used symmetric distance mea-
sure between two clusters are the reasons for using them
in our experiments though we would expect more complex
alternatives to also work with our framework.
6.2. Detection of Poison Base Class
Since poisoned training images are originally base class
samples, we expect the classifier to heavily depend on the
poison pattern to distinguish between the target class and
the base class for a poisoned sample. In this case, when
loss function’s cross-entropy target is set as the base class,
we can expect the input gradient of the poisoned sample to
concentrate around the poison signal as changes to the poi-
son pattern will flip the prediction from the target to base
class. In contrast, when the loss function’s cross-entropy
target is set as other non-poisoned classes, the input gradi-
ent will be distributed more among ‘real’ features that dis-
tinguish between the target class and the other class.
With this intuition, we expect the magnitude of poisoned
samples’ first principal gradient components to have the
largest value when the cross-entropy label is set to the poi-
son base class. In all 18 experiments of large and small-
sized poisons, this is indeed a reliable approach to find poi-
son base class, as shown in Appendix Table 11 and 13 where
the poison base class consistently gives the largest mean
first principal gradient component value among poisoned
samples. The mean first principal gradient component value
is smaller when the cross-entropy target is set to the poison
target class than the base class. We believe that this is due
to a larger portion of the input gradient being spread across
‘real’ features since poisoned images originate from base
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class and have ‘real’ feature differences with clean target
class images, especially when target and base classes are
visually distinct (e.g. ‘Bird’ vs ‘Truck’). We summarize the
poison class detection method in Appendix Algorithm 2.
7. Neutralization of Poisoned Models
Now that we have the methods to detect poison target and
base classes from § 6, and to filter out poisoned samples
from § 5, the next natural step is to neutralize the poison
backdoor in the classifier model so that the model is safe
from backdoor exploitation when deployed. One direct and
effective approach is to retrain the model to unlearn that the
poison pattern is a meaningful feature.
7.1. Counter-Poison Perturbation
The effect of poison backdoor lies in the model’s associ-
ation of the poison pattern with only the poison target class,
classifying images containing the poison as the target class.
The next step of our proposed neutralization method helps
the poisoned model unlearn this association by retraining
on an augmented dataset where the extracted poison signal
is added to all other classes, eliminating the backdoor to the
target class. The first step of constructing the augmented
dataset is to generate the poison signal to add to images
from other classes. In practice, we find that the poison sig-
nal extracted from a pool of only poisoned samples has a
closer resemblance to the real poison pattern, compared to
one from a pool of poisoned and clean samples from the tar-
get class. At this stage, we would have already filtered poi-
soned samples using Appendix Algorithm 3 in the previous
step, hence making it possible to extract the poison signal
from only filtered poisoned samples. While computing the
input gradients of the images, we set the cross-entropy tar-
get as the current class instead of the target poison class
to avoid the model associating ‘real’ target class features
to these other classes. This preserves good performance
on clean target class images after the retraining step. The
data augmentation steps are summarized in Appendix Al-
gorithm 4.
7.2. Relabeling of Poisoned Base Class Samples
Since we know the poison base class at this stage, we
can relabel the filtered poisoned samples to the correct class
(base class) as part of the augmented dataset. This requires
no additional computation while further helps the models to
unlearn the association of the poison to the target class.
7.3. Full Algorithm
In real-world poisoning attacks, the poison target and
base classes are usually unknown to us. The first stage of
our neutralization algorithm is hence to detect these classes,
using Appendix Algorithm 2. After finding the poison
classes, we can use Appendix Algorithm 3 to filter out poi-
soned samples from clean samples in the target class. Fi-
nally, Appendix Algorithm 4 creates the augmented dataset.
Together with a relabeling step of poisoned samples, this
augmented dataset eliminates the backdoor from the poi-
soned model during retraining. The full defense algorithm
is summarized in Algorithm 1.
8. Evaluation of Neutralization Algorithm
We evaluate the full suite of neural BP defense (Algo-
rithm 1) on a realistic threat scenario where the target/base
classes, poison pattern and ratio of poisoned data are un-
known.
8.1. Setup
Our experiments are conducted on the CIFAR10 dataset
[13] with ResNet [11] and VGG [26] image classifier. We
use a publicly available ResNet18 and VGG19 implemen-
tation 1 for our experiments.
Nine unique poison target-base pairs are used in our ex-
periments. On top of the same eight class pairs from [29],
we include (‘Dog’-‘Cat’) to probe one more case where tar-
get and base classes are highly similar. We study all nine
pairs on both large-sized poisoning and small-sized poison-
ing scenarios. For large-sized poisons, we use a randomly
drawn image from CIFAR100 training set, to ensure the poi-
son image has a different class from CIFAR10, and overlay
on the poisoned samples with 20% opacity. For each small-
sized poison target-base pairs, a set of random color and
pixel position determines which pixel in poisoned samples
is to be replaced with the poison color. In all 18 experi-
ments, 10% of the training samples from the base class are
randomly selected as poisoned samples and mislabeled as
the target class. We use ρ = 500 in Appendix Algorithm 4
for our experiments and retrain the poisoned model on the
defense’s augmented dataset for one epoch. Unless stated
otherwise, all results are shown for 10% poison ratio on
ResNet18.
8.2. Evaluation of Neutralized Models
We summarize the evaluation results in Table 1 for large-
sized poisons and in Table 2 for small-sized poisons. In all
poisoning scenarios, the model has high test accuracy on
clean test images (≥ 95% on all 10,000 CIFAR10 test set).
The accuracy drops drastically when evaluated on the 1,000
poisoned base class test images, ≤ 16.5% for overlay poi-
sons and ≤ 2.0% for dot poisons. After the neutralization
process, for all poison cases, the accuracy of the model in-
creases significantly, highlighting the effectiveness of our
method. There is a slight dip (≤ 1%) in test accuracy on
clean test images which we speculate is due to the model
1https://github.com/kuangliu/pytorch-cifar
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Algorithm 1: Main Algorithm
Input: Training data containing poisoned samples D = Dc ∪Dp, randomly initialized classifier f .
Initialize Spoisoned, Srelabeled = {}
Train f on D to get poisoned classifier fp.
target class, base class = Find-Poison-Target-Base-Class(fp, D) . Algorithm 2
Df , Spoisoned = Filter-Poisoned-Images(fp, Dtarget class, target class, base class) . Algorithm 3
Dcp = Add-Counterpoison-Perturbation(fp, D, Spoisoned, target class, base class) . Algorithm 4
for all (x, y) ∈ Spoisoned do
y = base class . Relabel poisoned samples
Srelabeled = Spoisoned
Dneutralize = Dcp ∪ Srelabeled . Combine augmented and relabeled images
Retrain fp on Dneutralize to get neutralized model fn.
Return fn.
Table 1. Accuracy on full test set and poisoned base class test images, before and after neutralization (Neu.) for full-sized overlay poison.
Poison Sample Target Acc Before Neu. (%) Acc After Neu. (%)
All Poisoned All Poisoned
Dog 95.0 4.6 94.3 88.6
Frog 95.2 11.3 95.0 97.6
Cat 95.5 2.5 94.5 95.3
Bird 95.0 16.5 94.4 95.3
Deer 95.3 1.2 94.9 94.6
Bird 95.4 5.0 94.6 97.3
Horse 95.0 16.6 94.9 90.8
Cat 95.2 12.5 94.3 87.8
Dog 95.0 9.6 94.5 96.1
sacrificing test accuracy to learn more robust features after
the new training samples are perturbed against the gradient
of the loss function, a phenomenon also observed in adver-
sarially trained classifiers [30].
Experiments on 5% poison ratio (Appendix Table 16 &
17) and on VGG19 (Appendix Table 18 & 19) similarly dis-
play the effectiveness of our defense.
8.3. Comparison with Baseline Defences
8.3.1 Detection of Poisoned Samples
When compared with another poison detection baseline
called Activation Clustering (AC) [6] and we observe that
our method is more robust in the detection of poisoned sam-
ples (Table 3 and 4). For full-sized overlay poison attacks,
ACs sensitivity (accuracy of detecting poisoned samples) is
< 50% for 4 out of the 9 CIFAR10 poison pairs in our ex-
periments while our proposed detection method shows high
sensitivity (> 85%) consistently (Table 3). For the 9 small-
sized dot poison attacks, there are 3 pairs where AC detects
poisoned samples with accuracy < 60% (sensitivity) while
our proposed method shows comparatively high sensitivity
(> 80%) for all the poison pairs (Table 4). Since images
from different CIFAR-10 classes (like cats and dogs) may
look semantically more similar to one another than those
from datasets evaluated in [6] like MNIST and LISA, we
speculate that the activations of poisoned samples closely
resemble those of clean samples despite being originally
from different class labels. As a result, it is challenging to
separate them with AC which relies on differences between
activations of poisoned and clean target class samples. In
contrast, our proposed method detects poisoned samples
through their input gradients similarity with the extracted
poison signal. This decouples the inter-class activation sim-
ilarity problem from the detection of poisoned samples, thus
explaining the more robust performance of our method.
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Table 2. Accuracy on full test set and poisoned base class test images, before and after neutralization (Neu.) for dot poison.
Sample Target Acc Before Neu. (%) Acc After Neu. (%)
All Poisoned All Poisoned
Dog 95.4 0.5 94.9 87.5
Frog 95.4 0.4 95.0 95.9
Cat 95.3 0.4 95.2 86.0
Bird 95.2 1.0 95.0 96.3
Deer 95.3 0.5 95.1 96.4
Bird 95.3 2.0 95.3 96.4
Horse 95.3 1.0 94.6 81.4
Cat 95.1 1.4 95.0 90.6
Dog 95.4 3.0 95.2 98.2
Table 3. Full overlay poison detection (Specificity/Sensitivity) comparison with Activation Clustering (AC) [6] defense. Specificity is the
accuracy of clean sample classification while sensitivity is the accuracy of poisoned sample classification.
Poison Pair # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Ours (%) 99.4 / 94.6 99.6 / 96.0 99.2 / 95.6 99.7 / 89.8 97.5 / 87.4 99.5 / 95.4 98.9 / 95.8 99.7 / 89.2 99.6 / 93.6
AC (%) 70.7 / 46.6 73.4 / 96.2 99.8 / 93.4 50.6 / 13.0 72.4 / 70.8 68.4 / 79.8 59.2 / 6.4 50.0 / 45.2 99.8 / 94.2
Table 4. Dot-sized poison detection (Specficity/Sensitivity) comparison with Activation Clustering (AC) defense.
Poison Pair # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Ours (%) 99.6 / 92.8 99.5 / 88.6 99.7 / 99.0 96.8 / 84.4 99.9 / 99 99.7 / 100 99.1 / 95.8 99.3 / 94 99.52 / 99.8
AC (%) 71.7 / 80.0 65.3 / 92.0 99.4 / 97.4 53.4 / 25.4 85.8 / 92.4 59.7 / 44.6 72.3 / 97.2 64.9 / 59.0 99.7 / 91.0
8.3.2 Final Neutralization
Other backdoor defense approaches such as [29, 16, 32] as-
sume either prior knowledge about the attack’s target class
and poison ratio or the availability of a verified clean dataset
which makes it different from the more challenging threat
model considered in this paper. Nonetheless, on experi-
ments with the same poison parameters, our method is com-
petitive (Table 5), compared to the defense in [29].
Table 5. Post-defense poison success rate (lower is better) com-
parison of full neutralization pipeline with spectral signature (SS)
filtering [29] for 10% dot poison ratio.
Poison Pair # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Ours (%) 6.0 0 3.7 0.4 0.4 0.1 6.1 5.4 0
SS (%) 7.2 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.7 0.4 0.7 6.7 0
9. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a comprehensive defense to
counter backdoor attacks on neural networks. We show how
poison signals can be extracted from input gradients of poi-
soned training samples. With the insights that the princi-
pal components of input gradients from poisoned and clean
samples form distinct clusters, we propose a method to de-
tect the presence of backdoor poisoning, along with the cor-
responding poison target and base class. We then use the ex-
tracted poison signals to filter poisoned from clean samples
in the target class. Finally, we retrain the model on an aug-
mented dataset, which dissociates the poison signals from
the target class, and show that it can effectively neutralize
the backdoor for both large- and small-sized poisons in the
CIFAR10 dataset without prior assumption on the poison
classes and size. Comparison with baselines demonstrates
both our approach’s superior poison detection and its com-
petitiveness with existing methods even under a more chal-
lenging threat model. Our method consists of several key
modules, each of which can potentially be a building block
of more effective defenses in the future.
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A. Poison Signals in Input Gradients
A.1. Constructing a Backdoor
A.1.1 A Binary Classification Example
Our example considers clean data samples (x, y) from a dis-
tribution Dc such that:
y ∈ {−1,+1}, x1 ∼ N (0, 1), x2, · · · , xd+1 ∼ N (ηy, 1)
where xi are independent and N (µ, σ2) is gaussian distri-
bution with mean µ and variance σ2. In this dataset, the fea-
tures x2, · · · , xd+1 are correlated with the label y whereas
x1 is uncorrelated at all. We denote (x−,−1) for samples
with label −1 and (x+,−1) for sample with label +1.
We can consider a simple neural network classifier fc
with a hidden layer made up of two neurons and RELU ac-
tivation function g which is able to achieve high accuracy
for Dc:
a11 = w
1
1
>
x + b11, a
1
2 = w
1
2
>
x + b12,
fc(x) := sign(w21g(a
1
1) + w
2
2g(a
1
2))
where w11 =
[
0,− 1d , · · · ,− 1d
]
, b11 = 0,
w12 =
[
0, 1d , · · · , 1d
]
, b12 = 0, w
2
1 = −1, w22 = 1 .
Considering the accuracy of fc on Dc,
Pr{fc(x) = y} = Pr{sign(w21g(w11>x) + w22g(w12>x)) = y}
= Pr
{
y
d
d∑
i=1
Ni(ηy, 1) > 0
}
(3)
where Ni are independent gaussian distributions. Fur-
ther simplifying it, we get
Pr{fc(x) = y} = Pr
{
N (η, 1
d
) > 0
}
= Pr
{
N (0, 1) > −η
√
d
} (4)
From this, we can observe that the accuracy of fc is
>99.8% on Dc when η ≥ 3√d . fc can have m times more
similar neurons in the hidden layer and get similarly high
training accuracy for Dc.
A.1.2 Effect of Poisoned Data on Learned Weights
We now consider a distribution of poisoned data D = Dc ∪
Dp which forms in a victim classifier fp a backdoor after
training. We study the case where an adversary forms a
backdoor that causes fp to misclassify x− samples as +1
when the poison signal is present. We denote the input-label
pairs from Dp as (xp, yp):
yp = +1, x1 = ψ, x2, · · · , xd+1 ∼ N (−η, 1) (5)
where the poison signal is planted in x1 with value ψ > 0
and yp is mislabeled as the target label +1. Note that xp
and x− are similar in their distribution except for their x1
values which contains the poison signal for xp. If we use
the same classifier fc from § A.1.1, fc(xp) = −1 6= yp,
resulting in classification ‘error’ for most xp. With ε being
the ratio of Dp samples in D, fc would have ‘error’ rate of
≈ ε for D.
For high training accuracy onD, we study another neural
network classifier fp with a hidden layer made up of three
different neurons and RELU activation function g:
a11 = w
1
1
>
x+b11, a
1
2 = w
1
2
>
x+b12, a
1
3 = w
1
3
>
x+b13,
fp(x) := sign(w21g(a
1
1) + w
2
2g(a
1
2) + w
2
3g(a
1
3))
similar to fc for the first two hidden neurons,
w11 =
[
0,−1
d
, · · · ,−1
d
]
, b11 = 0,
w12 =
[
0,
1
d
, · · · , 1
d
]
, b12 = 0, w
2
1 = −1, w22 = 1,
For fp’s third hidden neuron,
w13 =
[
1
d
, 0, · · · , 0
]
, b13 = −c
1
d
, w23 >
ηd
(ψ − c)
where c > 0 and g is the RELU activation function. The
negative sign of b13 suppresses the activation of the third
neuron (a13) for clean x− samples. Without this, its noise
value at x1 could have cause a13 to be positive and flip the
sign of fp(x−) to positive.
We can express the training accuracy on xp as
Pr{fc(xp) = +1} =
Pr{sign(w21g(a11) + w22g(a12) + w23g(a13)) = +1} (6)
Combining the definition of xp in (5) with observations in
(3) and (4), we get
Pr{fc(xp) = +1} = Pr
{
N
(
−η, 1
d
)
+ w23(ψ − c)
1
d
> 0
}
= Pr
{
N (0, 1) > η
√
d− (ψ − c)w
2
3√
d
}
(7)
For the training accuracy of poisoned samples
Pr{fc(xp) = +1} > 0.5, we need
η
√
d− (ψ − c)w
2
3√
d
< 0
which is satisfied when
c1 = (ψ − c) > 0 and (ψ − c)w
2
3√
d
> η
√
d
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From here, we can deduce that for high training accuracy
of poisoned samples, we need
c1
w23√
d
 η
√
d which implies w23 
1
c1
ηd
Combining with the result from (4) that η ≥ C√
d
is
needed for high training accuracy of x− and x+, we get
w23  c2
√
d. When d is large for high dimensional inputs,
w23  c2
√
d > 1 = |w21|, |w22| (8)
This means that the weight of third neuron representing
poisoned input feature would be much larger than that of the
first and second neurons representing normal input features.
In practice, poison feature neurons having larger weight val-
ues than clean feature neurons of deep neural networks is
observed empirically in other data poisoning studies (cite
papers).
During inference, most xp ∈ D would result in positive
a11 and a
1
3 while a
1
2 would be negative. The corresponding
activation values for x− and x+ in fp are summarized in
Table 6.
Table 6. Signs of fp activations and the corresponding partial
derivative (g′) of RELU function.
a11 a
1
2 a
1
3 g(a
1
1) g(a
1
2) g(a
1
3) g
′(a11) g
′(a12) g
′(a13)
x− + - - + 0 0 1 0 0
x+ - + - 0 + 0 0 1 0
xp + - + + 0 + 1 0 1
Since the RELU activation function is g(x) ={
x, x > 0
0, x < 0
and its derivative is g′(x) =
{
1, x > 0
0, x < 0
,
we can calculate the post-RELU activation values and their
derivative, also summarized in Table 6. The poisoned in-
puts xp have different profile of neuron activation from the
clean inputs x− and x+. More specifically, fp’s third neu-
ron is only activated by inputs with poison signal x1 = ψ,
like xp. Combining these insights about a poisoned clas-
sifier model’s ‘poison’ neuron weights and activations with
§ A.2, we propose a method to recover poison signals in
the input layer, detect poison target class and, subsequently,
poisoned images.
A.2. Poison Signal in Input Gradients
Proposition A.1. The gradient of loss function E with re-
spect to the input xi is linearly dependent on activated neu-
rons’ weights such that
∂E
∂xi
=
r1∑
j=1
[
w1ijg
′(a1j )
r2∑
l=1
δ2l w
2
jl
]
(9)
where δkj ≡ ∂E∂akj usually called the error, is the derivative
of E with respect to activation akj for neuron node i in layer
k. wkij is the weight for node j in layer k for incoming node
i, rk is the number of nodes in layer k, g is the activation
function for the hidden layer nodes and g′ is its derivative.
The detailed proof of this proposition is in Appendix B.
The gradient with respect to the input xi is linearly depen-
dent on the w1ij , g
′(a1j ) and w
2
jl terms. The value of δ
2
l is
dependent on the loss function of the classifier model and
the activations of the neural networks in deeper layers. In
fp, δ2l is simply ±1 meaning that |δ2l | = 1, we can get∣∣∣∣ ∂E∂xi
∣∣∣∣ = 3∑
j=1
[
w1ijg
′(a1j )w
2
j
]
(10)
We know the values of g′(a1j ) from Table 6. Since
g′(a13) = 0 for most x− and x+,
∣∣∣ ∂E∂x1 ∣∣∣ will be much larger
for poisoned samples xp than for clean samples, x− and
x+. Moreover, from (8) we know that the weight of ‘poi-
son’ neurons (w23) are much larger than weight of ‘clean’
neurons (w21 and w
2
2) when d is large, resulting in∣∣∣ ∂E∂x1 ∣∣∣  ∣∣∣ ∂E∂xi ∣∣∣ ,∀i 6= 1. Informally, this means that there
will be a relatively large absolute gradient value at the poi-
son signal’s input positions (x1) of poisoned inputs (xp)
compared to other input positions. In practice, when we
directly compare the gradients of poisoned samples with
those of clean samples, shown in Table 7, the gradients are
too noisy to discern poison signals. In § 4.2, we show how
we filter these input poison signals and use them to separate
poisoned from clean samples with guarantees in § 5.
12
Table 7. Gradients of randomly drawn poisoned and clean inputs with respect to the loss function. The poisoned target and base class are
‘Dog’ and ‘Cat’ respectively from the CIFAR10 dataset. Poisoned samples are overlaid with 20% of the poison image. The positive and
negative components of the input gradients and illustrated separately and normalized by the maximum value of the gradient at each pixel
position.
Poison Gradient of Poisoned Inputs Gradient of Clean Inputs
+
-
B. Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proposition B.1. The gradient of loss function E with re-
spect to the input xi is linearly dependent on activated neu-
rons’ weights such that
∂E
∂xi
=
r1∑
j=1
[
w1ijg
′(a1j )
r2∑
l=1
δ2l w
2
jl
]
(11)
where δkj ≡ ∂E∂akj usually called the error, is the derivative
of loss function E with respect to activation akj for neuron
node i in layer k. wkij is the weight for node j in layer k for
incoming node i, rk is the number of nodes in layer k, g is
the activation function for the hidden layer nodes and g′ is
its derivative.
Proof. We denote okl as the output for node i in layer k.
For simplicity, the bias for node i in layer k is denoted as a
weight wk0j with fixed output o
k−1
l = 1 for node 0 in layer
k − 1.
For k = m where m is the final layer,
∂E
∂ok−1i
=
∂E
∂akj
∂akj
∂ok−1i
akj =
rk−1∑
l=0
wkijo
k−1
l
∂akj
∂ok−1i
= wkij
∂E
∂ok−1i
= δkjw
k
ij
where
δkj ≡
∂E
∂akj
For 1 ≤ k < m,
∂E
∂ok−1i
=
rk∑
j=1
∂E
∂akj
∂akj
∂ok−1i
=
rk∑
j=1
δkjw
k
ij (12)
With chain rule for multivariate functions,
δkj ≡
∂E
∂akj
=
rk+1∑
l=1
∂E
∂ak+1l
∂ak+1l
∂akj
=
rk+1∑
l=1
δk+1l
∂ak+1l
∂akj
(13)
With definition of ak+1l ,
ak+1l =
rk∑
i=0
wk+1il g(a
k
j )
where g(x) is the activation function.
Taking partial derivative with respect to akj , we get
∂ak+1l
∂akj
= wk+1jl g
′(akj ) (14)
Substituting (14) into (13), we get
δkj =
rk+1∑
l=1
δk+1l w
k+1
jl g
′(akj )
= g′(akj )
rk+1∑
l=1
δk+1l w
k+1
jl
(15)
Finally, substituting (15) into (12), we get
∂E
∂ok−1i
=
rk∑
j=1
[
wkijg
′(akj )
rk+1∑
l=1
δk+1l w
k+1
jl
]
(16)
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C. Proof of Theorem 4.1 and 5.1
The second moment matrix of z is denoted by
Σ = E zz>
By further expanding this, we get,
Σ = E(
1
N
g11 · · · gN1 + µ1... . . . ...
g1n · · · gNn + µn

 g11 · · · g1n... . . . ...
gN1 + µ1 · · · gmn + µn
) (17)
Since E(Zij) = (EZ)ij , E gigj =
{
η, i = j
0, i 6= j and
E g = 0 , we get
Σ =
1
N
(
0 · · · µ1... . . . ...
0 · · · µn

 0 · · · 0... . . . ...
µ1 · · · µn
) + ηIn
= ε
 µ1
2 · · · µ1µn
...
. . .
...
µ1µn · · · µn2
+ ηIn
(18)
Theorem C.1. µ is the eigenvector of Σ and corresponds
to the largest eigenvalue if ε and ‖µ‖2 are both > 0.
Proof. Taking the matrix multiplication of Σ and µ, we get
Σµ = ε
 µ1
2 · · · µ1µn
...
. . .
...
µ1µn · · · µn2

µ1...
µn
+ ηIn
µ1...
µn

= ε
µ1
3 + µ1µ2
2 + · · ·+ µ1µn2
...
µ1
2µn + µ2
2µn + · · ·+ µn3
+ η
µ1...
µn

= ε(µ1
2 + · · ·+ µn2)
µ1...
µn
+ η
µ1...
µn

= (ε‖µ‖22 + η)
µ1...
µn

= (ε‖µ‖22 + η)µ
(19)
Thus, µ is an eigenvector of Σ with eigenvalue λ1(Σ) =
ε‖µ‖22 + η. Next, we proceed to prove that λ1(Σ) is the
largest eigenvalue.
Let D = ε
 µ1
2 · · · µ1µn
...
. . .
...
µ1µn · · · µn2
,
then we can express Σ as
Σ = D + ηIn (20)
Similar to (19), we can get
Dµ = ε
 µ1
2 · · · µ1µn
...
. . .
...
µ1µn · · · µn2

µ1...
µn

= ε
µ1
3 + µ1µ2
2 + · · ·+ µ1µn2
...
µ1
2µn + µ2
2µn + · · ·+ µn3

= ε(µ1
2 + · · ·+ µn2)
µ1...
µn

= (ε‖µ‖22)µ
(21)
This shows that µ is also an eigenvector of D with eigen-
value λ1(D) = ε‖µ‖22.
From (18), we observe that D is a product of a matrix
by its own transpose. This implies that D is positive semi-
definite and all its eigenvalues are non-negative. Further-
more, the sum of all these eigenvalues is
n∑
i=1
λi(D) = tr(D)
= ε‖µ‖22
= λ1(D)
(22)
This implies that the other eigenvalues λ2(D) = · · · =
λn(D) = 0. From this, we know that all vectors v which
are orthogonal to µ,
∀v ∈ Rn : 〈v, µ〉 = 0
Dv = 0
Combining with (20), we get
Σv = Dv + ηInv
= ηv
(23)
With this, we can deduce that Σ’s other eigenvalues
λ2(Σ) = · · · = λn(Σ) = η.
For λ1(Σ) to be the largest eigenvalue, this statement has
to be true:
λ1(Σ) > max
i6=1
λi(Σ)
14
With our previous calculations of λi(Σ) in (19) and (23),
we get
ε‖µ‖22 + η > η
ε‖µ‖2 > 0 (24)
This statement is true if ε > 0 and ‖µ‖2 > 0 which
completes the proof.
Remark C.1.1. The operator or spectral norm of Σ, ‖Σ‖,
equals to the absolute value of its largest singular value.
Since Σ is a positive semi-definite matrix, its largest singu-
lar value is the same as its largest eigenvalue. This implies
that
‖Σ‖ = ε‖µ‖22 + η (25)
Theorem C.2 (Matrix Bernstein [31]). Let Z1, · · · ,ZN be
symmetric n× n random matrices. Assume that ‖Zi‖ ≤ K
almost surely and let ‖∑i Z2i ‖ ≤ σ2. Then,
Pr
{∥∥∥∥∥∑
i
Zi
∥∥∥∥∥ > t
}
≤ 2n exp
(
−cmin
{
t2
σ2
,
t
K
})
where c > 0 is an absolute constant.
Theorem C.3 (Covariance Estimation [22]). Let Σ =
E zz> be the second moment matrix ofRn random vector z.
With independent samples z1, · · · , zN , ΣN = 1N
∑
i ziz
>
i
is the unbiased estimator of Σ. Assume that ‖zi‖22 ≤ M .
Then,
Pr{‖ΣN −Σ ‖ > ‖Σ ‖} ≥ 1−2n exp
(
−c1 N
2 ‖Σ‖
M + ‖Σ‖
)
where  ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. Let Zi = 1N
(
ziz
>
i −Σ
)
Then,
N∑
i=1
Zi =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ziz
>
i −Σ
= ΣN −Σ
(26)
To apply Theorem C.3 to (26), we need to bound ‖Zi‖
and ‖∑i Z2i ‖.
To bound ‖Zi‖,
‖Zi‖ = ‖ 1
N
(
ziz
>
i −Σ
) ‖
With triangle inequality, we get
‖Zi‖ ≤ 1
N
(‖ziz>i ‖+ ‖Σ ‖) (27)
While considering the term ‖ziz>i ‖, we note that ziz>i is
a positive definite matrix. Then,
‖zz>‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
z1...
zn
 [z1 · · · zn]
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 z1
2 · · · z1zn
...
. . .
...
z1zn · · · zn2

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
= s1(zz
>)
= λ1(zz
>)
≤ tr(zz>)
= z1
2 + · · ·+ zn2
= ‖z‖22
(28)
Substituting (28) into (27), we get
‖Zi‖ ≤ 1
N
(‖zi‖22 + ‖Σ ‖)
Since ‖zi‖22 ≤M ,
‖Zi‖ ≤ M + ‖Σ ‖
N
= K (29)
where K is the term from Theorem C.3.
To bound ‖∑i Z2i ‖, we first expand Z2i .
Z2i =
1
N2
(
ziz
>
i −Σ
)2
=
1
N2
[
(ziz
>
i )
2 −Σ(ziz>i )− (ziz>i )Σ+Σ2
] (30)
Taking expectation of both sides, we get
EZ2i =
1
N2
[
E(ziz>i ziz>i )− E[Σ(ziz>i )]− E[(ziz>i )Σ] + EΣ2
]
=
1
N2
[
E(zi‖zi‖22z>i )−ΣE(ziz>i )− E(ziz>i )Σ+Σ2
]
(31)
Since ‖zi‖22 ≤M ,
EZ2i 
1
N2
[
M E(ziz>i )−ΣE(ziz>i )− E(ziz>i )Σ+Σ2
]
By definition, Σ = E zz>
EZ2i 
1
N2
(
M Σ−Σ Σ−Σ Σ+Σ2)
=
1
N2
(M Σ−Σ2)
(32)
Thus, ∥∥∥∥∥E
N∑
i=1
Z2i
∥∥∥∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥ 1N (M Σ−Σ2)
∥∥∥∥
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With triangle inequality, we get∥∥∥∥∥E
N∑
i=1
Z2i
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
∥∥∥∥MN Σ
∥∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥∥ 1N Σ2
∥∥∥∥
=
M‖Σ ‖+ ‖Σ ‖2
N
= σ2
(33)
where σ2 is the term from Theorem C.3.
Applying Theorem C.3 for
∑N
i=1 Zi with (29) and (33),
and recalling from (26) where∑N
i=1 Zi = ΣN −Σ, we get
Pr{‖ΣN −Σ ‖ > ‖Σ ‖}
≤ 2n exp
(
−c1min
{
N2 ‖Σ‖2
M ‖Σ‖+ ‖Σ‖2 ,
N ‖Σ‖
M + ‖Σ‖
})
= 2n exp
(
−c1min
{
N2 ‖Σ‖
M + ‖Σ‖ ,
N ‖Σ‖
M + ‖Σ‖
})
(34)
Assuming  ∈ (0, 1],
Pr{‖ΣN −Σ ‖ > ‖Σ ‖} ≤ 2n exp
(
−c1 N
2 ‖Σ‖
M + ‖Σ‖
)
Thus,
Pr{‖ΣN −Σ ‖ ≤ ‖Σ ‖} ≥ 1−2n exp
(
−c1 N
2 ‖Σ‖
M + ‖Σ‖
)
(35)
Theorem C.4 (Davis-Kahan Theorem). Let S and T be
symmetric matrices with same dimensions. Fix i and as-
sume that the ith largest eigenvalue is well separated from
the other eigenvalues:
min
j:j 6=i
|λi(S)− λj(S)| = δ > 0
Then, the unit eigenvectors vi(S) and vi(T) are close to
each other up to a sign.
∃θ ∈ {−1, 1} : ‖vi(S)− θvi(T)‖2 ≤ 2
2
3 ‖S−T‖
δ
Theorem C.5 (Guarantee of Poison Classification through
Clustering). Assume that all zi are normalized such that
‖zi‖2 = 1. Then the error probability of the poison cluster-
ing algorithm is given by
Pr
{
Nerror ≤ c2N
(
1
‖µ ‖2 +
η
ε‖µ ‖32
)}
≥
1− 2n exp
(
−c1N2 (ε‖µ ‖
2
2 + η)
1 + ε‖µ ‖22 + η
)
(36)
where Nerror is the number of misclassified points and
 ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. To find the difference between unit eigenvectors
v1(Σ) and v1(ΣN ), we applying Theorem C.4 for i = 1,
S = Σ, T = ΣN ,
δ = min
j 6=1
|λ1(Σ)− λj(Σ)|
With our previous calculations of λi(Σ) in (19) and (23),
we get
δ = ε‖µ‖22 + η − η
= ε‖µ‖22
(37)
The conclusion of Theorem C.4 then becomes
∃θ ∈ {−1, 1} : ‖v1(Σ)−θv1(ΣN )‖2 ≤ 2
2
3
ε‖µ‖22
‖Σ−Σn ‖
Combining this with the Theorem C.3, we get
Pr
{
‖v1(Σ)− θv1(ΣN )‖2 ≤ 2
2
3
ε‖µ‖22
‖Σ ‖
}
≥
1− 2n exp
(
−c1 N
2 ‖Σ‖
M + ‖Σ‖
)
(38)
We now have a probability bound of difference between
v1(Σ) and v1(ΣN ). To find the probability bound on the
number of misclassified points, let us consider the case
where zi is from a non-poisoned point.
If zi is from a poisoned point,
E〈µ, zi〉 = E
[µ1 · · · µn]
µ1 + g1...
µn + gn


= E(µ12 + g1µ1 + · · ·+ µn2 + gnµn)
= E(µ12 + · · ·+ µn2) + E(g1µ1 + · · ·+ gnµn)
= ‖µ‖22
(39)
Dividing by ‖µ‖22 on both sides, we get
E〈 µ‖µ‖2 ,
zi
‖µ‖2 〉 = 1
From Theorem 4.1, since we know that µ is the first
eigenvector of Σ, µ‖µ‖2 is its first unit eigenvector v1(Σ).
Then,
E〈v1(Σ), zi‖µ‖2 〉 = 1 (40)
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If zi is from a non-poisoned point,
E〈v1(Σ), zi‖µ‖2 〉 =
1
‖µ‖22
E
[µ1 · · · µn]
g1...
gn


=
1
‖µ‖22
E(g1µ1 + · · ·+ gnµn)
=
1
‖µ‖22
· 0 = 0
(41)
Now, we consider the inner product of zi with the differ-
ence between v1(Σ) and v1(ΣN ).
z>i v1(Σ)− θz>i v1(ΣN ) = z>i (v1(Σ)− θv1(ΣN ))
By Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality,
|z>i v1(Σ)−θz>i v1(ΣN )| ≤ ‖zi‖2 · ‖v1(Σ)−θv1(ΣN )‖2
By considering all the N samples of xi,
N∑
i=1
|z>i v1(Σ)−θz>i v1(ΣN )| ≤ N‖zi‖2·‖v1(Σ)−θv1(ΣN )‖2
Dividing by ‖µ‖2 on both sides, we get
N∑
i=1
| z
>
i
‖µ‖2v1(Σ)− θ
z>i
‖µ‖2v1(ΣN )| ≤
N
‖zi‖2
‖µ‖2 ‖v1(Σ)− θv1(ΣN )‖2 (42)
N∑
i=1
|〈v1(Σ), zi‖µ‖2 〉 − θ〈v1(ΣN ),
zi
‖µ‖2 〉| ≤
N
‖xi‖2
‖µ‖2 ‖v1(Σ)− θv1(ΣN )‖2 (43)
Combining this with (38), we get
N∑
i=1
|〈v1(Σ), zi‖µ‖2 〉 − θ〈v1(ΣN ),
zi
‖µ‖2 〉| ≤
N
‖zi‖2
‖µ‖2 ·
2
2
3
ε‖µ‖22
‖Σ ‖ (44)
with probability ≥ 1− 2n exp
(
−c1N
2 ‖Σ‖
M+‖Σ‖
)
.
From (40) and (41), we know that the expected value
of 〈v1(Σ), zi‖µ‖2 〉 is either 0 or 1. So, every sample zi
for which 〈v1(Σ), zi‖µ‖2 〉 and 〈v1(ΣN ), zi‖µ‖2 〉 disagree con-
tributes at least 1 to the sum in (44). Then, we can inter-
pret the sum as the number of erroneously classified points
Nerror when using v1(ΣN ) to separate poisoned from non-
poisoned points.
Assume that all zi are normalized vectors, ‖zi‖2 = 1
and M = 1. Moreover, we know from Remark C.1.1 that
‖Σ‖ = ε‖µ‖22 + η. Thus,
Nerror ≤ c3N · ε‖µ‖
2
2 + η
ε‖µ‖32
with probability ≥ 1 − 2n exp
(
−c1N2 ε‖µ‖
2
2+η
1+ε‖µ‖22+η
)
,
where c3 > 0 is an absolute constant.
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D. Algorithms
Algorithm 2: Find-Poison-Target-Base-Class
Input: Training data containing poisoned samples D,
poisoned model fp. Let Dy be the set of training
examples corresponding to label y, cluster
Wasserstein distance ratio threshold τ . Let Gy(x) be
∂Ey
∂x where Ey is the loss function value with respect
to label y.
for all y do
Ny = |Dy| which is the number of samples
labeled y
for all xi ∈ Dy do
Compute Gˆy =
Gy(xi)
‖Gy(xi)‖2
Let My = [Gˆy]
Ny
i=1 be the Ny × n matrix of Gˆ.
Compute vy , the first right singular vector of My
with SVD.
Compute ty = Myvy .
Execute unsupervised clustering on Ty to get 2
clusters, C1 and C2.
W2y =W2(C1, C2)
ytarget = max
y
W2y
if W2ytargetmean
y 6=ytarget
(W2y)
> τ then
target class = ytarget
for all y 6= target class do
Npoisoned = |Spoisoned|
for all xi ∈ Spoisoned do
Compute Gˆy =
Gy(xi)
‖Gy(xi)‖2
Let My = [Gˆy]ni=1 be the Npoisoned × n
matrix of Gˆ.
Compute vy , the first right singular vector of
My with SVD.
Compute ty = Myvy .
Compute tˆy = mean(ty).
base class = argmax
y 6=target class
|tˆy|
Return target class, base class
Algorithm 3: Filter-Poisoned-Images
Input: Training data containing poisoned samples D,
poisoned model fp. Let Dy be the set of training
examples corresponding to label y. Let Gy(x) be
∂Ey
∂x where Ey is the loss function value with respect
to label y.
Ntarget class = |Dtarget class| which is the number of
samples labeled target class
for all xi ∈ Dtarget class do
Compute Gˆbase class =
Gbase class(xi)
‖Gbase class(xi)‖2
Let M = [Gˆbase class]
Ntarget class
i=1 be the Ntarget class × n
matrix of Gˆ.
Compute v, the first right singular vector of M with
SVD.
Compute t = Mv.
Execute unsupervised clustering on T to get 2
clusters, C1 and C2.
if |C1| > |C2| then
Df = C1, Spoisoned = C2
else
Df = C2, Spoisoned = C1
Return Df , Spoisoned
Algorithm 4: Add-Counterpoison-Perturbation
Input: Training data containing poisoned samples D,
poisoned model fp. Let Dy be the set of training
examples corresponding to label y, filtered poisoned
samples Spoisoned, perturbation factor ρ. Let Gy(x)
be ∂Ey∂x where Ey is the loss function value with
respect to label y.
for all y 6= target class do
Npoisoned = |Spoisoned|
for all xi ∈ Spoisoned do
Compute Gˆy =
Gy(xi)
‖Gy(xi)‖2
Let My = [Gˆy]
Npoisoned
i=1 be the Npoisoned × n
matrix of Gˆ.
Compute vy , the first right singular vector of My
with SVD.
for all xj ∈ Dy do
Set xj = Clip(xj + ρvy)
Return D
E. Additional Figures
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Table 8. Appendix: (a) Overlay poison image, (b) the first right vector of input gradients for all target class images which include clean and
poisoned images. (c) The first right vector of input gradients for only clean target class images.
Poison Sample Target 1st V of all target images 1st V of clean target images
+ - + -
Dog
Frog
Cat
Bird
Deer
Bird
Horse
Cat
Dog
Table 9. Appendix: (a) Dot-poisoned sample, (b) the first right vector of input gradients for all target class images which include clean and
poisoned images. (c) The first right vector of input gradients for only clean target class images.
Poison Target 1st V of all target images 1st V of clean target images
+ - + -
Dog
Frog
Cat
Bird
Deer
Bird
Horse
Cat
Dog
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 4. First principal component of poisoned and clean target class input gradients in an overlay image BP attack. The components on
the left are derived with the target class as cross-entropy label while the ones on the right are derived with the base class as cross-entropy
label. (a) Target: ‘Dog’, Base: ‘Cat’ (b) Target: ‘Frog’, Base: ‘Ship’ (c) Target: ‘Cat’, Base: ‘Car’ (d) Target: ‘Bird’, Base: ‘Airplane’
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(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
Figure 5. Continued from Figure 4; (e) Target: ‘Deer’, Base: ‘Horse’ (f) Target: ‘Bird’, Base: ‘Truck’ (g) Target: ‘Horse’, Base: ‘Cat’ (h)
Target: ‘Cat’, Base: ‘Dog’ (i) Target: ‘Dog’, Base: ‘Car’
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Table 10. Wasserstein distance between GMM clusters of input gradient first principal components with under overlay image BP attacks.
The target class is identified as the class with highest distance value.
Poison Target Base Wasserstein Distance
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
5 3 0.00166 0.00320 0.00219 0.00233 0.00259 0.0427 0.00134 0.00249 0.00178 0.00160
6 8 0.00235 0.00229 0.00272 0.00326 0.00305 0.00238 0.103 0.00212 0.0186 0.00243
3 1 0.00236 0.00426 0.00298 0.0454 0.00212 0.00196 0.00170 0.00245 0.00274 0.00260
2 0 0.00440 0.00176 0.0824 0.00230 0.00231 0.00259 0.00152 0.00169 0.00195 0.00295
4 7 0.00215 0.00319 0.00254 0.00374 0.0655 0.00404 0.00269 0.0161 0.00146 0.00449
2 9 0.00328 0.00131 0.0156 0.00194 0.00222 0.00169 0.0016 0.00364 0.00297 0.00960
7 3 0.00288 0.00176 0.00234 0.0111 0.00355 0.00224 0.00307 0.0995 0.00149 0.00229
3 5 0.00250 0.00213 0.00183 0.0612 0.00243 0.00219 0.00179 0.00223 0.00340 0.00221
5 1 0.00228 0.00360 0.00319 0.00201 0.00218 0.00365 0.00164 0.00334 0.00287 0.00209
Table 11. Mean first principal component of input gradient with varying cross entropy label with overlay poison. The base class is identified
as the class with highest mean component value.
Poison Target Base Mean 1st component
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
5 3 0.109 0.014 0.028 0.324 0.006 0.157 0.093 0.039 0.021 0.074
6 8 0.288 0.292 0.312 0.316 0.296 0.314 0.324 0.316 0.346 0.306
3 1 0.219 0.301 0.158 0.222 0.223 0.197 0.199 0.228 0.24 0.233
2 0 0.321 0.292 0.297 0.285 0.289 0.286 0.294 0.284 0.286 0.299
4 7 0.104 0.015 0.113 0.146 0.005 0.126 0.125 0.303 0.087 0.061
2 9 0.187 0.156 0.186 0.163 0.178 0.174 0.161 0.177 0.191 0.233
7 3 0.306 0.301 0.307 0.332 0.294 0.294 0.31 0.312 0.308 0.309
3 5 0.244 0.243 0.236 0.249 0.224 0.279 0.221 0.225 0.242 0.246
5 1 0.004 0.093 0.019 0.010 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.001 0.004 0.026
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Table 12. Wasserstein distance between GMM clusters of input gradient first principal components with under dot-sized BP attacks. The
target class is identified as the class with highest distance value.
Sample Target Base Wasserstein Distance
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
5 3 0.0139 0.0111 0.0145 0.0184 0.0162 0.241 0.0121 0.0104 0.0077 0.0154
6 8 0.0213 0.0197 0.0185 0.0227 0.0214 0.0193 0.0462 0.0145 0.0173 0.0157
3 1 0.00288 0.00172 0.00220 0.248 0.00287 0.00215 0.00182 0.00174 0.00333 0.00266
2 0 0.00888 0.00439 0.0787 0.00452 0.00445 0.00415 0.00248 0.00306 0.00327 0.00403
4 7 0.0172 0.018 0.0146 0.0173 0.410 0.0159 0.015 0.0119 0.00984 0.0128
2 9 0.0111 0.00543 0.360 0.00468 0.00344 0.00471 0.00435 0.00376 0.00320 0.00383
7 3 0.0123 0.0134 0.0161 0.0183 0.0135 0.0146 0.0109 0.229 0.00675 0.0115
3 5 0.00799 0.0130 0.0113 0.160 0.0137 0.0104 0.0127 0.00921 0.00678 0.00964
5 1 0.00257 0.00325 0.00240 0.00278 0.00259 0.175 0.00184 0.00224 0.00194 0.00236
Table 13. Mean first principal component of input gradient with varying cross entropy label with dot-sized poison. The base class is
identified as the class with highest mean component value.
Sample Target Base Mean 1st component
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
5 3 0.466 0.464 0.453 0.583 0.358 0.511 0.420 0.375 0.417 0.477
6 8 0.062 0.044 0.031 0.035 0.029 0.074 0.042 0.019 0.278 0.044
3 1 0.443 0.657 0.347 0.378 0.28 0.24 0.352 0.289 0.409 0.302
2 0 0.299 0.17 0.212 0.204 0.128 0.168 0.229 0.129 0.179 0.196
4 7 0.662 0.485 0.448 0.471 0.639 0.631 0.237 0.825 0.593 0.161
2 9 0.479 0.51 0.542 0.501 0.529 0.505 0.495 0.556 0.501 0.632
7 3 0.466 0.422 0.503 0.542 0.374 0.464 0.444 0.485 0.475 0.458
3 5 0.3 0.239 0.255 0.336 0.281 0.473 0.130 0.259 0.237 0.284
5 1 0.278 0.513 0.122 0.335 0.332 0.362 0.308 0.335 0.287 0.271
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Table 14. Poison clustering accuracy for overlay poison. Specificity is the accuracy of clean sample classification while sensitivity is the
accuracy of poisoned sample classification.
Poison Target Base Target Class Xent Base Class Xent
Specificity(%) Sensitivity(%) Specificity(%) Sensitivity(%)
5 3 98.0 63.8 99.4 94.6
6 8 99.7 93.4 99.6 96.0
3 1 99.2 74.4 99.2 95.6
2 0 99.8 84.2 99.7 89.8
4 7 97.4 73.4 97.5 87.4
2 9 97.3 68.8 99.5 95.4
7 3 98.7 94.2 98.9 95.8
3 5 99.5 83.8 99.7 89.2
5 1 85.3 61.6 99.6 93.6
Table 15. Poisoned sample filtering accuracy for dot-sized poison. Specificity is the accuracy of clean sample classification while sensitivity
is the accuracy of poisoned sample classification.
Sample Target Base Target Class Xent Base Class Xent
Specificity(%) Sensitivity(%) Specificity(%) Sensitivity(%)
5 3 97.9 86.6 99.6 92.8
6 8 89.8 67.0 99.5 88.6
3 1 98.9 92.4 99.7 99.0
2 0 96.4 70.0 96.8 84.4
4 7 99.1 83.6 99.9 99.0
2 9 96.2 99.2 99.7 100
7 3 98.9 92.0 99.1 95.8
3 5 95.6 83.2 99.3 94.0
5 1 98.6 96.8 99.5 99.8
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Table 16. Model accuracy on full test set and poisoned base class test images, before and after neutralization (Neu.) for full-sized overlay
poison attacks with 5% poison ratio.
Poison Sample Target Acc Before Neu. (%) Acc After Neu. (%)
All Poisoned All Poisoned
Dog 95.1 11.9 94.5 80
Frog 95.1 24.3 95.1 96.3
Cat 95.3 6.8 94.7 93.5
Bird 95.0 46.5 94.4 92.2
Deer 95.1 5.0 94.8 90.4
Bird 95.3 11.3 94.9 90.3
Horse 95.0 49.0 94.7 89.3
Cat 95.4 23.9 95.0 89.6
Dog 95.3 15.8 94.5 95.6
Table 17. Model accuracy on full test set and poisoned base class test images, before and after neutralization (Neu.) for dot poison attacks
with 5% poison ratio.
Sample Target Acc Before Neu. (%) Acc After Neu. (%)
All Poisoned All Poisoned
Dog 95.3 0.8 94.9 90
Frog 94.9 0.5 94.7 95.7
Cat 95.1 1.0 94.8 97.7
Bird 95.3 1.7 95.1 96.3
Deer 95.1 2.2 94.7 96.7
Bird 95.4 1.8 95.2 96.6
Horse 95.0 0.3 94.9 87.9
Cat 95.2 2.7 94.9 90.5
Dog 95.4 8.2 95.2 97.3
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Table 18. Model accuracy on full test set and poisoned base class test images, before and after neutralization (Neu.) for full-sized overlay
poison attacks on VGG with 10% poison ratio.
Poison Sample Target Acc Before Neu. (%) Acc After Neu. (%)
All Poisoned All Poisoned
Dog 93.9 7.6 92.9 81.2
Frog 93.5 15.4 92.9 96.1
Cat 93.6 7.3 92.2 87.9
Bird 93.1 30.7 92.7 89.8
Deer 93.6 4.5 93.1 86.7
Bird 93.8 6.4 93.0 93.5
Horse 93.4 48.9 93.5 86.7
Cat 93.4 21.5 92.2 74.5
Dog 93.7 11.3 92.6 94.8
Table 19. Model accuracy on full test set and poisoned base class test images, before and after neutralization (Neu.) for dot poison attacks
on VGG with 10% poison ratio.
Sample Target Acc Before Neu. (%) Acc After Neu. (%)
All Poisoned All Poisoned
Dog 93.7 1.1 93.1 80.6
Frog 93.6 0.2 93.1 96.2
Cat 93.6 1.0 93.0 73.5
Bird 93.6 2.0 93.4 93.3
Deer 93.8 0.3 93.5 94.5
Bird 93.3 2.4 93.2 95.8
Horse 93.4 0.8 93.1 88.0
Cat 93.5 2.9 93.4 86.6
Dog 93.8 6.5 93.3 97.6
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